Military Aid in Dictatorial Africa: Reconsidering the Standard
By Caleb Epstein
For decades, Western governments have justified military assistance to African states as an investment in regional stability, counterterrorism, and strategic partnerships. Yet these objectives often collide with another stated foreign policy priority: the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. The result is a persistent contradiction. Governments that undermine democratic institutions may continue receiving military support if they remain valuable security allies, while others face sanctions and aid restrictions after unconstitutional changes of power. This inconsistency raises a fundamental question: should military assistance be determined solely by how leaders came to power, or by how they govern once in office? A comparison of Mali and Uganda illustrates the growing tension between strategic interests and democratic principles, exposing the selective application of international norms governing military aid.
Mali is widely regarded as one of the most dangerous countries in the world. Plagued by armed conflict and a persistent jihadist insurgency, the West African nation mirrors the broader instability that has characterized much of the Sahel. Mali is also regarded as one of the least free countries in the world. Since leading a military coup in 2021, junta leader Assimi Goïta has banned opposition parties, postponed general elections, and tightened his grip on media outlets. It is therefore unsurprising that Mali has ranked 136 out of 182 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index and 121 out of 180 in the World Press Freedom Index. Not far apart in these rankings lies Uganda. In fact, Uganda ranked worse in both of the mentioned indices. Yet, despite the comparable authoritarian tendencies of post-2021 Mali and President Yoweri Museveni’s Uganda, the international community has adopted markedly different approaches toward the two countries, particularly regarding military assistance.
Section 7008 of the US Consolidated Appropriations Act has served as a key pillar of U.S. foreign policy regarding aid distribution and the preservation of democratic governance since its original enactment in 1985. The statute prohibits the direct financing of governments that achieved power through a coup d’etat or decree, except for some humanitarian and national security-focused aid categories. Since its first enactment in the mid-1980s, the provision has been applied to several West African countries, including Mali. However, authoritarian governments that retain power through rigged elections rather than military coups generally fall outside of its scope. This distinction largely explains the differing diplomatic U.S. approaches toward Mali and Uganda. Other aid-distributing countries have formulated principles similar to Section 7008; for example, France suspended joint military operations and aid in Mali following Goïta’s coup, but maintains a bilateral military partnership with Uganda.
If Section 7008 is intended to promote democratic governance and constitutional transfers of power, its underlying principles arguably deserve broader application. Museveni did not seize power through a bloody coup, but maintains it through necropolitics and election fixing. The past two Ugandan general elections in 2021 and 2026 have featured widespread violence carried out by the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF). Opposition leaders have been imprisoned and tortured, innocent voters have been killed, and the voices of the public are suppressed. In his forty years of presidency, Museveni, one of Africa’s longest-standing dictators, has displayed a similar disregard for democratic institutions to Mali’s Goïta.
It is important to note that since the 2000s, Uganda has served as a lynch pin to AMISOM’s and AFRICOM’s operations in combating Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Leaning into the national security exemption of Section 7008, the US funded and trained the UPDF directly in the early 2010s. The training and supplies that prepared elite Ugandan counterterrorist units to fight in Somalia may have also strengthened Museveni’s security apparatus. Notwithstanding, given the blurred line between the UPDF and Uganda Police Forces, it is undeniable that the US’s $300 million of military aid between 2011 and 2021 made the UPDF more effective in oppressing Ugandans. The power attached to the aid was funneled to Museveni and his most loyal followers. The spillover effect of military aid in Uganda is the reinforcement of its brutal dictator.
There is a parallel in the democratic landscapes of Mali and Uganda. Nonetheless, the international community has drawn a diplomatic distinction regarding military aid. In Africa’s new era of democratic backsliding, the US and other aid-distributing countries must expand the principles that Section 7008 highlights, rather than contract them. Every five years, Museveni commits a political maneuver akin to a coup in order to secure his election. By directing mass killings and disappearing his political opponents, Museveni maintains his power. With Section 7008 as the precedent, military aid must be restricted from Uganda as long as its necropolitical rule continues.
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Photo Source: The Independent
